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ABSTRACT
Concentration of power among transnational ‘Big Food’ 
companies has contributed to food systems that are 
unsustainable, unhealthy and inequitable for people and 
planet. Given these commercial determinants of health, if 
‘food systems transformation’ is to be authentic—more 
than a passing narrative—then leveraging Big Food is 
paramount. To this end, researchers, practitioners and 
policy- makers are increasingly encouraged to engage 
with these powerful entities. However, given the conflicts 
of interest at stake, engagement relies on trust and 
transparency, that all stakeholders take responsibility for 
their actions and demonstrate commitment to do no harm. 
Given Big Food’s track record in influencing policy, shifting 
costs and responsibility for their harms—and while profit 
primarily drives business decision making—we question 
whether it is logical to expect trust.
This analysis explores concepts of responsibility and 
trust in relation to food systems transformation involving 
public- private partnerships. Through short cautionary 
case studies—looking at the United Nations Food 
Systems Summit, and Big Food’s plastic burden—it 
argues that unless such companies take responsibility 
for their cross- cutting effects and earn authentic trust 
through demonstrably doing no harm, their participation 
in evidence generation and policy processes should 
be limited to responding to information requests and 
adhering to regulation. Any involvement in research 
agenda- setting or formulating policy solutions introduces 
conflicts of interest, legitimises corporate irresponsibility 
and jeopardises scientific integrity. Big Food has dynamism 
and power to address food system problems, but while 
it contributes to so many of these problems it should 
follow—not formulate—transformational evidence, 
policies and regulations.
INTRODUCTION
Food systems are broken and must be trans-
formed is the narrative that has permeated 
global agendas and normalised into the main-
stream. Such is its strength that the United 
Nations, backed by the World Economic 
Forum, held a Food Systems Summit—
the first of its kind—in September 2021 to 
‘launch bold new actions to transform the way 
the world produces and consumes food, deliv-
ering progress on all 17 Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals.’1
Given the narrative, uncomfortable power- 
related questions must follow, such as: Who 
is responsible for these failures? Who should 
formulate and determine the solutions? What 
should these look like? How should they be 
implemented and monitored?
Many would point towards corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability 
commitments of big business as proof of 
a willing and capable private sector best- 
placed to drive such transformation. Others 
perceive CSR initiatives as small- scale ‘side 
salads’ diverting attention from slow struc-
tural progress or business as usual.2 Centring 
the ‘private sector’ itself is problematic given 
its heterogeneity—encompassing not only 
large transnational companies but small-
holder farmers and market traders. Dispar-
ities between these stakeholders are stark. 
Summary box
 ► Food systems are unsustainable, inequitable and 
unhealthy, with transnational ‘Big Food’ companies 
commercially determining the health of people and 
planet.
 ► Food systems transformation necessitates private 
sector engagement, but the private sector is diverse. 
The urgency and scale of food system problems re-
quires change where the power lies: Big Food.
 ► Public–private partnerships require trust, which 
itself relies on responsibility, accountability and 
transparency.
 ► Given its track record, Big Food does not engender 
trust. Hence—while engagement should certainly 
take place (ie, through information sharing)—such 
companies should not be involved in agenda- setting.
 ► Inviting Big Food to join research and policy agenda- 
setting efforts legitimises irresponsible corporate 
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On the one hand, are an estimated 2 billion people—
many living under the poverty line—in smallholder (<2 
hectare) farming households.3 On the other, is a small 
number of large transnational companies—predomi-
nantly based in high- income countries but with complex 
tax domiciles—concentrating power across food systems. 
This concentration is demonstrated by recent mergers in 
global seed and agrochemical sectors, where four compa-
nies—Bayer, Corteva, ChemChina- Syngenta and BASF—
control 60%–80% of market share, stifle competition and 
foster interdependency between specific seeds, chemicals 
and technologies.4 The situation in global food and drink 
supply chains is similar,5 where such companies are often 
termed ‘Big Food’.
This unchecked concentration has permitted transna-
tional companies to make exorbitant profits and exert 
undue policy influence, to the extent that regulations do 
not adequately protect against environmental, human 
health and social harms .4 6 In this sense, food systems—in 
their current form—may not be ‘broken’ but functioning 
as intended for those that prosper from the status quo.7
Therefore, if transformation is to actually be…trans-
formative…for human and planetary health, change 
is needed where the greatest impacts, power and scale 
exist—in this case, among Big Food. However, the 
stimuli for such businesses to change their behaviour 
manifests in many forms, reflecting different world-
views—from ‘softer’ collaborative partnerships, self- 
regulation and shared goal- setting, to ‘harder’ fiscal 
and regulatory instruments. In other words, the much- 
fabled carrots and sticks.8 In a predominantly neoliberal 
global economic system—typified by revolving doors 
between industry and governments—softer approaches 
dominate.
It is within this context that researchers, practitioners 
and policy- makers generating and using multidisci-
plinary food systems evidence are encouraged to ‘engage 
with the private sector’. The rationale; that transforma-
tive change requires multistakeholder approaches with 
all actors around the table. The challenge though is that 
meaningful engagement requires trust. And trust relies 
on tenets such as responsibility and transparency. Both of 
which imbue power and are, therefore, often contested.9
This analysis explores concepts of trust and respon-
sibility surrounding the types of Big Food companies 
that determine human and planetary health; companies 
increasingly engaged in codeveloping multistakeholder 
solutions for food systems transformation.10 We discuss 
themes relevant to this topic and present two short 
cautionary tales; one looking at Big Food’s involvement 
in the United Nations Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) 
and another on its plastic burden, in order to ask:
 ► What can history tell us about the willingness of trans-
national Big Food companies to take responsibility 
for, and act expeditiously on, their commercial deter-
minants of public and planetary health?
 ► Given the conflicts of interest at stake, is it desirable 
or realistic to expect trust in Big Food, when the 
raison d'etre of such companies is to pursue profits, 
not social goods and public and planetary health?
CONTEXT
Are food systems broken?
Despite advances in productivity, food safety and supply 
chains, the prevailing ‘broken- needs- fixing’ narrative is 
hard to refute. Food systems account for a third of global 
greenhouse gas emissions11 and intensive industrial 
agriculture is depleting and damaging water, soils and 
forests rapidly.12 13 Meanwhile, supply- driven consump-
tion within linear economies has flooded ecosystems with 
persistent organic pollutants and synthetic materials, 
including single- use plastics.14 15 Sustainably nourishing 
potentially 9 billion people within planetary boundaries 
is of urgent concern, particularly as a myriad of activities 
and populations comprising food systems are themselves 
exposed to the very environmental crises to which they 
contribute.16 17
Food systems are not just environmentally unsustain-
able, but unhealthy and inequitable—as evidenced by 
the ill affordability of healthy diets18 as well as uneven 
progress (and in some cases, regression) in all forms 
of malnutrition.19 This perfect storm has been called a 
global ‘syndemic’.20 Closely associated is the precarity of 
agricultural livelihoods—particularly of women and the 
marginalised—and the appropriation and destruction of 
Indigenous land, ways of life and knowledge systems.21 
Taken together—and with the COVID- 19 pandemic 
further exacerbating these frailties19—there is little doubt 
that food systems must change for people and planet. But 
what contributed to this calamity?
Commercial determinants of planetary and population health
Commerce has affected human health ever since popula-
tions and cultures interacted, traded and subjugated one 
another.22 The impacts of consuming harmful commod-
ities—particularly alcohol and tobacco—have been 
increasingly scrutinised and evidenced by public health 
communities.23 24 In recent years, evidence has accumu-
lated on the multiple harms caused by consumption of 
ultraprocessed foods and sugar- sweetened beverages,25 26 
and their increasing share in diets.27 However, it is not 
only the consumption of unhealthy products that can be 
harmful, indeed the production and supply of many prod-
ucts—both healthy and unhealthy—can cause broader 
harms. As such, ‘commercial determinants of health’ has 
emerged as a holistic framing of the human impacts of 
business activities across different sectors.28 This framing 
accounts for the practices, economic systems and regula-
tory environments that generate direct and indirect harms 
along supply chains and product life- cycles.29 A timely 
example of these life- cycle harms is the case of Tyson 
Foods—the USA’s biggest chicken processor—where 
deteriorations of working rights and conditions among 
farmers and employees is reported, alongside environ-
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living nearby factories.30 Many of the problems associated 
with food systems are driven by the production and supply 
of foods that are artificially cheap because such environ-
mental and social costs are not brought inside business 
practices or prices. Unhealthy commodity industries 
(UCIs) producing harmful products often share similar 
characteristics and maintain interwoven organisational 
relationships, employing—sometimes coordinated—
approaches to influence policy and public discourse.22 31 
Food systems are home to many such industries, where 
agro- chemical and agri- food companies interact and 
co- shape narratives,32 33 including recently to harness the 
COVID- 19 pandemic through marketing strategies, polit-
ical lobbying and CSR activities.34
Many Big Food companies, such as Bayer (pharma-
ceutical, agrochemical and life sciences), or Unilever 
(consumer goods), straddle different economic sectors 
and continents. These types of border- defying businesses 
generate profits and impacts across geographies and 
domains, affecting human health and the environment. 
Hence they are increasingly understood to be commer-
cially determining planetary health.35 Such broader 
recognition signifies the importance of joined- up 
collaboration; between academic disciplines, govern-
ment sectors and civil societies, to facilitate information 
sharing and action. But where does this leave the compa-
nies themselves? Can they be trusted to fix the problems 
they have created? Or is this akin to ‘putting Dracula in 
charge of the blood bank’?36
Towards responsibility in the food system
Identifying commercial determinants of health is an 
important step towards accountability and evidence- 
based change, but is just that—a step. Transformation 
requires accountability that sticks; where stakeholders 
accept responsibility for harmful outcomes and comply 
with corrective and preventative policies (not to mention 
clean- up or compensation). However, apportioning 
accountability means weighing up social vs individual 
responsibilities; a process that reflects the spectrum of 
philosophical positions concerning how humans should 
or shouldn’t be governed and the degree to which free- 
market capitalism prevails.22
Where malnutrition is concerned, some state that ‘to 
understand who is responsible[…]it is first necessary to 
ask: Who rules global food systems?’.33 The answer is not 
consumers, whose choices—although complex and multi-
faceted—are confounded by an ‘illusion of diversity’ in 
markets dominated by a handful of companies promoting 
near- identical, cheap and unhealthy products.37 Choice is 
the point at which individuals interact with the food envi-
ronment. It forms the bridge in their relationships with 
the architects of that environment; the food industry and 
government. The food industry provides choice; govern-
ment shapes and regulates these choices (often under 
industry influence or civil society pressure); and individ-
uals operate within the resulting space. In competing with 
industry- concocted psychological marketing campaigns, 
distraction techniques and political lobbying to deprioritise 
progressive diet- related policies, consumers’ ability to ‘vote 
with their feet’ may be something of a fallacy. Indeed, amid 
food systems so influenced by powerful interests, personal 
choice (vis a vis personal responsibility) is something of a 
misnomer. When consumer choice is genuinely possible, it 
is among a relatively privileged minority who are able to eat 
healthily, or to purchase fair or sustainably produced items. 
At national and supranational levels, governments and multi-
lateral agencies are themselves apparently stunted in their 
ability to enact structurally transformative, cross- cutting and 
robust food systems regulation to protect people and planet. 
Whether it is failing to close tax avoidance loopholes, to limit 
volatile financial speculation, to enforce adequate anti- trust 
laws, or to truly protect human rights, policies affecting food 
systems appear at best to be ‘tinkering at the margins’38 and 
at worst facilitating Big Food’s priorities and concentration 
of power.
However, that is not to say the public and their elected 
representatives are destined to be passive bystanders in 
broken food systems. Quite the opposite. Social change has 
only ever been realised when civil society exerts a unified 
voice that governments cannot ignore; hence the growing 
calls for collective action and solidarity to challenge food 
systems power imbalances and realise the right to food.39–41 
Discursive progress towards this can be found in language 
such as ‘industrial epidemics’42 that—like ‘commercial deter-
minants of health’—shifts the focus of responsibility from 
consumers back to producers and marketeers.
However, while responsibility may be attributed to Big 
Food, engaging such companies in research and policy 
processes to ‘transform’ food systems necessitates mutual 
trust; that stakeholders can be relied on to act with integ-
rity and share common vision and commitment towards 
healthy humans and planet. Without this, meaningful 
engagement may be a mirage.
Trust and engagement
Trust is an intangible construct with many definitions, 
ranging from the multidimensional (encompassing tenets 
such as competence, consistency and empathy) to the 
sociopsychological (such as the trust bestowed in institu-
tional structures that regulate everyday life, or the calcula-
tive and rational trust mediated by logical assumptions and 
experiences).43 44 Since these definitions commonly overlap, 
what perhaps matters more is how trust can be built and 
maintained between Big Food, public researchers and policy- 
makers across government, given the scale and urgency of 
the global syndemic which necessitates leveraging and rebal-
ancing of commercial power.
Cvitanovic et al45 present fourteen trust- building strate-
gies along with a stepwise process for repairing damaged 
relationships at the interface of science and policy. At the 
very top of this list sits transparency; a fundamental char-
acteristic acknowledged by others to be of foundational 
importance, particularly when combined with honesty 
and dignity.44 But while these characteristics may be 
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food systems are concerned, a consensus for pursuing 
engagement in the first place does not exist.
Stuckler and Nestle33 describe three stances on public 
health communities engaging with Big Food. First, a 
hands- off off approach that promotes self- regulation and 
leaves responsibility for healthy choices to the public; 
second a commitment to partnering with industry; and 
third, a sceptical position that refutes both other stances 
given their inherent conflicts of interest, instead advo-
cating governmental assertiveness through regulation. 
A recent analysis among academic, business and public 
sector food system stakeholders suggests the third stance 
is a common barrier to public- private partnerships, not 
least because it involves trust, or lack thereof.46 This is 
perhaps unsurprising, since conflicts of interest—real or 
perceived—impact research agendas, scientific integrity 
and policy.47 48
However, where engagement may still be pursued, 
principles have been developed to aid careful navigation 
around conflicts of interest.49 50 One such tool, by Galea 
and McKee51 proposes five tests for public partnerships 
with large corporations. The first asking: are the ‘core 
products and services provided by the corporation health 
enhancing or health damaging’. This initial hurdle—
viewed through a commercial determinants of health 
lens—would preclude partnership with many Big Food 
companies, even if their market concentration means 
they offer both healthy and unhealthy products. Unlike 
ultraprocessed foods, tobacco or alcohol, the human 
and planetary health characteristics of many individual 
products is often debatable or on a sliding scale based on 
consumption, thus complicating matters further.
These are the quagmires faced by public researchers, 
practitioners and government policy- makers.
CAUTIONARY CASE STUDIES
Boxes 1 and 2 present two short case studies looking at 
the conduct of Big Food companies, illustrating the types 
of conduct and infiltration of agenda- setting processes 
that jeopardises trust among researchers, practitioners 
and government policy- makers.
Box 1 Multistakeholderism in food system policy- making: the United Nations Food Systems Summit (UNFSS)
In late July 2021, the UNFSS held a ‘Pre- Summit’—2 months before the main event took place in New York.
Many organisations and individuals engaged in the UNFSS consultative process via various online consultations since late 2020—while others 
boycotted it and organised a counter mobilisation.53 Critics argue that governance of the Summit process was opaque, principles of engagement with 
the private sector were weak, conflicts of interest and power asymmetries were not systematically acknowledged or addressed, and human rights 
were marginalised54 55 UNFSS leaders largely met this criticism with silence.
The Summit positioned itself as a ‘people’s summit’, with leaders highlighting the importance of participation. The widely espoused concept of 
‘multistakeholderism’ opened the door to engagement with multinationals whose products and practices have been shown to drive malnutrition and 
planetary health harms. No representative of a multinational company sat on the formal leadership ‘action tracks’ but they actively participated in 
the Private Sector Guiding Group (PSGG). The PSGG was led by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)—an association 
with an open membership, including tobacco giant Philip Morris and many multinational food companies whose products and practices have been 
associated with malnutrition (especially obesity and linked non- communicable diseases).56 Two of the latter—Nestlé and PepsiCo—were invited to 
speak at several Summit sessions.
The WBCSD ran other sessions including one in which a speaker from European Food Information Council (EUFIC) sowed doubt on the definition of, 
and harms caused by, ultraprocessed foods, despite the growing evidence of the latter (EUFIC count Coca Cola, Cargill and Bunge among their Board 
members.)
Publicly, the UNFSS positioned itself as a participation- based public–private partnership, while privately, the role of multinationals in decision 
making remained unclear throughout. But what was clear was the presence of Big Food around the high table where the shape of future food systems 
transformation was discussed and where decisions were made.
It is hardly surprising therefore that the Summit has been criticised for failing to acknowledge conflicts of interest. Its principles of engagement 
were weak—especially when compared with other UN conferences. They included vacuous ‘principles’ such as ‘be respectful’, ‘recognise complexity’ 
while omitting standard principles adopted by other UN processes such as ‘do no harm’. Complexity is often used by Big Food as a smokescreen to 
diminish the role of their products in poor health, for example, in the context of obesity by diverting attention away from harmful commodities towards 
physical activity.57
The final UNFSS principle was to ‘build trust’. Summit leaders often lamented a lack of trust in food systems governance. What was lacking 
however was a concerted attempt to uncover what drives this mistrust, and how it may be addressed. If this was another major systemic problem 
affecting food systems—for example, a lack of finance—there would have been working groups trying to figure out how to solve it. But nothing like 
that happened in the UNFSS process.
If we consider the trust- building strategies suggested by Cvitanovic et al45 in the context of the UNFSS, we hit the first stumbling block straight 
away: ‘ensure process transparency’. Transparency is a key component of good governance. As mentioned, many critics of the UNFSS process 
pointed to its opaque governance. Not much was publicly disclosed about the criteria for choosing action track leaders, the process for clustering and 
prioritising ‘game changing’ solutions, for deciding on commitments, and the accountability mechanisms for making any such commitments stick. 
Trust has to be earned and proactively built.
One of the most widely shared videos emerging from the UNFSS pre- summit was a 10 min speech by Professor Jeffrey Sachs in which he 
reminded participants that the most successful, evidence- based public–private partnership to date was…taxation: ‘To private sector leaders—















ealth: first published as 10.1136/bm






Yates J, et al. BMJ Global Health 2021;6:e007350. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2021-007350 5
BMJ Global Health
CONCLUSION
The case studies presented in boxes 1 and 2 are illustra-
tive examples, among many, of Big Food’s track record 
which demonstrate a lack of responsibility that, in turn, 
fails to engender trust. Given this track record, we ask: 
is it reasonable to expect researchers, practitioners and 
government policy- makers to engage with such compa-
nies in processes of evidence generation, policy agenda- 
setting or determining solutions for food systems trans-
formation? And if so, where should the onus for such 
engagement lie? Our stance aligns broadly with the 
last position presented by Stuckler and Nestle33—that 
powerful transnational companies must demonstrate 
clear adherence to the principle of ‘do no harm’ and 
make significant, independently verifiable progress in 
improving food environments and impacts along product 
life- cycles before mutual engagement and collaboration 
can be expected. The ‘walk’ should precede the ‘talk’ 
if trust is to be earned…not the other way around. This 
means that robust systems of accountability must be put 
in place and sustained to meaningfully monitor progress 
across geographies and domains, and track impacts 
generated at all stages of a product’s life- cycle.52
If food system transformation is to be more than a 
passing narrative, then the inherent risks of research 
and policy engagement with Big Food must be taken 
seriously and navigated with care. Recent events—such 
as the UNFSS—suggest that this view is not shared by 
those promoting multistakeholder models of participa-
tion open to anyone and everyone—regardless of who 
they are, what their motives are, and what power they 
hold. Implicit in this model are at least two assumptions. 
First, that Big Food can be persuaded to do the right 
thing for human and planetary health by being present 
at decision- making tables, while not overshadowing or 
excluding other less- powerful stakeholders. And second, 
that this involvement does not confer legitimacy or 
acceptability on Big Food’s harmful products and prac-
tices among international communities of public and 
planetary health. We question both of these assump-
tions. First, because they imply that more information 
and collaboration will somehow provoke companies into 
fundamentally changing their business practices and 
ethics, as opposed to simply reformulating products—
an ideal largely unsupported by history. And second, 
because unconditionally opening the door to Big Food 
jeopardises the integrity of research and policy- making 
processes while simultaneously implicitly (if not explic-
itly) conferring legitimacy by becoming part of the ‘food 
and nutrition community’.
Box 2 Where did they think it would go? The plastic burden of big food.
Plastic pollution is a defining 21st century problem, increasingly recognised as a determinant of poor human and planetary health.58 This problem can 
no longer be ignored, hence a step- change in political and corporate action. But why did action take so long with evidence mounting for decades? 
One factor is (ir)responsibility.
Plastics are used extensively across food systems, particularly for packaging.59 A handful of companies dominate global food and beverage 
markets, including Coca- Cola, Nestlé, PepsiCo and Unilever. Together, these topped Break Free from Plastic’s 2020 brand pollution audit60 and 
generate an estimated 83 football pitches worth of unmanaged plastic waste each day.61
Such companies have set (and often missed) voluntary targets to increase recycled content of their products, while operating small- scale 
community corporate social responsibility projects that repurpose plastic waste.62 These strategies have thus failed on two major elements of the 
problem; to reduce virgin plastic use and prevent waste, at scale. Proven strategies, such as deposit- return schemes63 have been reluctantly agreed- 
to in some markets while actively fought against elsewhere.64 Rather than dent their operating profits (which, for the aforementioned companies 
exceeded $500B between 2010 and 2020) Big Food continued to prop- up the plastics industry and its Big Oil cousins through business as usual. 
Indeed it was only in 2019 that Coca Cola and PepsiCo—under pressure—departed the Plastics Industry Association, a major policy advocacy trade 
group.
By embedding themselves in overlapping webs of industry groups and arms- length initiatives Big Food has covertly lobbied governments and 
subtly shifted the discourse of responsibility so as to lumber the public with the costs of recycling.62 64 An infamous example is Coca Cola, which—
alongside influencing public health policy in the USA65—finances Keep America Beautiful, the industry- backed group that produced the notorious 
‘Crying Indian’ advert which emotively passed the buck of litter to the public by proclaiming: ‘people start pollution, people can stop it’.66 (infamous 
also because the actor playing the Indigenous man was actually Italian- American). But when waste management systems do not exist or cannot cope 
with demand, individual efforts are severely limited, hence the pandemic of ‘wishcycling’ wherein consumers hope—without proof—that systems are 
able to process their waste; a mismatch between aspiration and reality often causing more harm than good.
An estimated 172 million tonnes of plastic (raw materials and products) were imported into the African continent between 1990 and 2017,67 where 
the average rate of inadequately managed waste is estimated to be around 74%.14 In these circumstances, it is logical that food and beverage plastic 
packaging largely ends up as pollution, with human impacts.68 That Unilever uses more plastic per unit of sales in low- income and middle- income 
countries than in high- income countries only makes matters worse.61 Without the unsafe work of informal waste pickers—quite literally picking up 
the pieces of Big Food —the extent of this pollution would be far greater.69
With a history like this, it is not surprising that new initiatives such as the Plastics Recycling Alliance—launched in 2019 by Coca Cola, PepsiCo, 
Nestlé among others, to promote public–private partnerships to improve recycling capacities across Africa—are met with scepticism.70 71
There is no doubt that action on plastic is rapidly increasing, with the Big Food actors mentioned here moving faster than ever before as the era 
of extended producer responsibility becomes inevitable. However, in the face of clear evidence, a history of feet- dragging, regulatory interference and 
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These concerns relate to a simple question: Should Big 
Food be an external follower of rules, regulations and 
laws designed by governments to protect people and 
planet from commercial harm? Or should Big Food be 
helping to formulate these very protections? We argue 
for the former, on the basis that the latter equates to a 
fundamental conflict of interest resulting in fatal weak-
nesses among food systems ‘solutions’. The latter appears 
to apply a commercial determinants of health model to 
locate responsibility but then uses this information in 
a flawed manner—to bring these actors into solution- 
determining processes rather than to obtain insights at 
arms- length.
While we support the optimistic notion that trust is 
not immutable,43 as long as powerful multinational 
companies are driven primarily by profit maximisation 
and cannot demonstrate authentic transparency, the 
likelihood of trust being built and maintained appears 
unrealistic, if not naïve and illogical to expect. If this 
remains the case, then we agree with Sula- Raxhimi et al35 
that ‘to improve planetary health and produce healthy 
livelihoods around the world, solutions must be sought 
outside the wealth logic mechanisms of corporations.’
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